Many would judge the privatisation program which was a significant feature of the New Zealand Experiment of the 1980's and 90's, in which both Labour and National governments adopted extreme right wing policies, a failure. In looking at the privatisation of state assets we find they were, at least from an investors' perspective reasonably successful.
Introduction
The New Zealand economy, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was subject to what has become known as the "New Zealand experiment" (Kelsey, 1995) . Despite being recognised as a leader in the provision of social welfare the 1984 (re-elected 1987) Labour government made an extreme shift to the right, largely abandoning New Zealand's traditional welfare state, instead adopting neoliberal policies which ultimately resulted in a state based on competition (Larner, 1997) . The neoliberal agenda introduced by Labour was then continued, if not finished, by the centre right National government elected in 1990. However it would be an error to assume that the neoliberal programme introduced by the Labour government was accepted Labour party policy. For the most part the government was relying upon and following the advice of the New Zealand Treasury. In 1987 the incoming labour government was presented with a 'briefing paper'. This briefing paper was in effect a book of some 400 pages that outlined a blueprint that Treasury suggested the government adopt. The advice from Treasury contained chapters such as 'The role and limits of government', 'social policy', and more importantly for what was to come -'The Public Sector'. Upon even a superficial reading Government Management could not simply be considered advice. It is in essence an argument for the adoption of orthodox neoliberal ideology. The core of the argument was one of deregulation and an appeal to market forces market forces. For example Treasury advise "it is only sensible to organise economic and social activities…if the particular form of organisation chosen enables these activities to be provided more cheaply, more effectively or more equitably…than would provision through the market" Treasury (NZ Treasury, 1987, p. 3) .
As well as a move to deregulate the New Zealand economy, there was also a desire to make the business of government more efficient. In other words government departments were to be operated as corporate business units. In fact it was a requirement under the State owned Enterprise Act (1986) for SOEs to operate as successful business operations. To enable this, government departments were corporatised by being converted into State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and together with the State Sector Act (1988) CEOs and board directors appointed. As with private businesses, the performance of SOEs was to be measured in terms of profitability and as long as they returned profits to the shareholding minister and operated within the boundaries of the Companies Act, SOE's were given carte blanche to largely compete as they saw fit
The publication of Government Management was made in response to the increasing levels of government debt. Public debt was a major concern for the 1984 labour government and the spectre of privatisation was first raised in its 1987 budget speech as a solution (Wilson, 2010) . This was most likely as a result of advice received within the pages of Government Management in a section entitled "the case for privatisation" Treasury (NZ Treasury, 1987, pp. 112-113) . The other two ways identified were raising taxes and or cutting government spending. Both of these alternatives were at first considered unacceptable because this Labour government was philosophically opposed to any increase in taxes, believing tax increases would discourage job creation and investment. Reduced government spending was also not an option at this time as the only areas of government spending capable of providing meaningful savings were health, education and welfare, areas viewed as core government business by most labour politicians and voters. However the government, acting upon advice from both Treasury and powerful business lobbies such as the Business Roundtable, eventually followed neoliberal orthodoxy. It was a path that deeply divided the party members and was a contributing factor to the electoral loss of 1990. It was becoming apparent that by 1990 the first corporatisations had not yielded the expected efficiencies and as returns to the government owner from SOE's were expected to remain below the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) 2 market average (Wilson, 2010 Organisation. The LATE was required to make a profit and was also like the SOE to follow recognised business practice. In addition the amendments established the CEO as the employing agent for all local government employees rather than the council. This followed the separation of operations and policy which was in vogue in central government at the time.
As capital markets were comparatively undeveloped in New Zealand and in order to achieve the highest price possible, the early privatisations of SOE's were via trade sales to internationals businesses or syndicates who then on sold a portion to local and international markets. The policy of trade sales continued until 1996 when a coalition elected under New
Zealand's newly introduced mixed member proportional election system resulted in a National and NZ First coalition government. In the coalition the balance of power held by NZ (Espiner, 2008) .
Overall, New Zealanders looking back on this neoliberal experiment largely view it as a failure while accepting reform was necessary and New Zealand is a more efficient economy as a result (Schick, 1998) . A common criticism raised is that the social costs of the reforms were too great with Quiggin (1998) Two decades on from New Zealand's first privatisations there are some similarities in the privatisation rhetoric, with its primary purposes listed as; 1) Providing a future investment fund, which will reduce the need to borrow, while still providing investment capital needed to grow the economy and improve public services, 2) Giving New Zealanders the opportunity to invest in significant New Zealand assets, and 3) Deepening New Zealand capital markets (NZ Government, 2012) . Even while there are the claims that the political landscape has changed over the last twenty-five years, there is still the 20th century rhetoric regarding the inadvisability government ownership of revenue generating assets. However unlike the last neo-liberal Labour government, the current neo-liberal National government has recognised the public is unwilling to see strategic state assets sold out of New Zealand hands. The government's stated intention is to retain a 51% government interest and encourage retail investors, putting them at the head of the queue in the IPO and giving a loyalty bonus shares if they maintain their holding (Key, 2012) .
Despite the reluctance of the New Zealand public to see public New Zealand revenue generating assets sold overseas, they have appeared reluctant to venture into equity investment, preferring banks, finance companies and direct property investment. Whether this is because of lessons learnt from the 1987 share market crash and the excesses of big business which were continually highlighted through the 1990s is unknown. What is known is that attitudes to saving and investment have changed. New Zealanders appear to have accepted the likelihood of a state funded pension, sufficiently large to enable a reasonable quality of life in retirement, is unlikely. Consequently many have started making provision for their own retirement, either by saving directly or joining various Kiwi Saver schemes 7 . The current Prime Minister expects the new public share offers will renew New Zealander's interest in investing in shares (Key, 2012) .
Privatisations a Quantitative View
Given the government's desire for Mom and Pop investors to be at the front of the queue in this new round of privatisation this is an opportune time to re-evaluate the privatisations of the 1980s and 1990s as a retail investment vehicle. The basic research question is how Mom and Pop would have fared if they had bought into the public offerings of these privatisations when they had public offerings. We update a study by Kerr, Qiu and Rose (2008) and track the performance of their privatisation sample until either the eve of the 2011 New Zealand general election 8 or until they were delisted. Rather than measuring the medium return result this paper focuses on the long term, with holding periods for listed privatised assets ranging from 7.3 years to 22.1 years. The aim being to calculate the returns a
Mom & Pop investor would enjoy if they followed a buy & hold strategy of being fully invested in a portfolio of privatised assets rather than the market portfolio 9 as a whole.
From an investment viewpoint some privatisations were more successful than others.
This analysis looks for factors which may distinguish a successful privatisation investment from those which were less so. Further, we consider the contribution the first privatisation program had on the NZ share market as a whole. This research should prove valuable to government policy makers and investors alike when future privatisations are undertaken.
Long Run Performance
A study by Kerr, et al., (2008) details the impact of privatisation programs in both Australia and New Zealand in the late 1980s and 1990s serves as a base point for this analysis 8 of New Zealand privatisations. The aim of the Kerr paper was to examine, in both countries, the relationship between privatisation and share market capitalisation, liquidity and share ownership. The research also evaluated the long-run risk-return performance of the privatised companies' portfolios, though performance was only measured for five years at most. Their findings show a significant increase in share market capitalisation and increased liquidity, while also demonstrating an investment in a portfolio of privatised companies generated significantly higher returns than the market portfolio as a whole, for 4 out of 5 years (Kerr, et al., 2008) .
As the Kerr, et al., (2008) Results are presented in Table 1 (shown graphically in Appendix Figure 2) by National) who believed that method would yield the greatest value. As part of the trade sale process there was requirement for a portion of the firm's equity to be sold publicly on the NZ market. The BNZ was not initially a trade sale in that an issue of 15% was made by the BNZ to the public as a capital raising in March 1987 at a price of $1.80 (NZ Herald Staff, 1987) and closed on day 1 at a 3% premium. The intention of the was to sell the remainder later (New Zealand Government, 1988) , however the BNZ announced a loss of $648 million for the 1989 year and the government moved to recapitalise the bank by way of a rights issue, with 30% of the bank being taken by Capital Markets Ltd (Singleton, Grimes, Hawke & Holmes, 2006) .
The first public sale of AIR was an offering of 30% (5% reserved for airline staff and 25% for the NZ public) of the shares in October 1989 at a price of $2.40 (Reuters News, 1989) . The public issue of shares in TEL took place in July 1991 was at $2.00 and prompted the size of the float to be increased from 19% to 27% (Reuters News, 1991) , heavy demand in NZ and overseas markets resulted in the closing price on day 1 being a 15% premium.
The remaining 5 listings all out performed the NZX market over the period of this study. POA, initially owned by the Auckland Regional Council (ARC) (80%) and the Waikato Regional Council WRC) (20%) was privatised in October 1993 when the WRC sold its 20% stake on the NZX at $1.60 resulting in a one day premium of 9% (Reuters News, 1993a ). In July 2005 the ARC purchased all outstanding shares at $8.00 per share and delisted the port. Overall investors in POA would have received a XHPY of 9.54% if they had bought on day 1 or 10.39% if they were part of the IPO. TPW was formed out of the corporatisation of the Tauranga Power Board with half of the share in TPW distributed to its customers with the remainder held in a community trust (Reuters News, 1993b News, 1998) . The AIA was subject to considerable demand, both internationally and domestically, and share traded on day 1 at $2.05 for a day1 premium of 14%. Winston Peters,
Treasurer of the National NZ First coalition government described the float as an unprecedented success which was more than four times oversubscribed with 20.6% of AIA owned by retail NZ investors, 9.9% NZ institutions, 47.5% Auckland councils and only 20.6% international institutions (Reuters News, 1998) 
Conclusions
The obvious conclusion from the above quantitative analysis is the privatisation program had a considerable impact on the NZ economy with privatisations comprising over a third of the NZ share market. NZ investors have also fared well long run return to shareholders investing in privatised firms generally doing well, with an overall return of 12.71% compared to the market return of 7.01%. This result is even more creditable when one considers that four of the earliest privatisations, BNZ, AIR, TEL and TRH would by most be considered failures. Further research is required to identify if there are common features in the underperformance of these four privatisations. An obvious factor could be the time period in which they were sold by the government, as they were the first four 
